In this paper, we develop a novel theory of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Firms can choose between di¤erent modes of foreign market access: exporting, green…eld FDI, and cross-border M&A. Our theory is based on three key ideas. First, there is heterogeneity in …rms'capabilities. Second, these capabilities di¤er in their degree of international mobility. Third, capabilities are traded in a merger market. We address two questions: (1) what are the characteristics of …rms that choose the various modes of foreign market access, and (2) how does the composition of international commerce vary across industries and countries?
Introduction
In an increasingly globalized world, the decision of how best to serve foreign markets is becoming one of the key challenges facing …rms. A …rm that has decided to sell its product abroad has two distinct options of serving foreign markets: exporting or producing locally (foreign direct investment (FDI)). If the …rm decides to produce locally, it can choose between building its own establishment (green…eld investment) or to acquire an existing …rm (cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A)). The fundamental di¤erence between cross-border M&A and green…eld FDI is that cross-border M&A involves a transaction between a buyer and a seller at an endogenous price, while green…eld FDI is simply an investment decision that does not involve a market transaction and is therefore not directly constrained by market clearing conditions for …rm assets.
While the di¤erence between cross-border M&A and green…eld investment might seem subtle at …rst glance, there is a belief among the agents who conduct or in ‡uence international commerce that these modes are in fact very di¤erent. First, a vast business literature suggests that …rms view cross-border M&A and green…eld investment as very di¤erent modes of FDI so that the choice between these modes requires careful cost/bene…t analysis. Second, as international commerce has increasingly taken the form of foreign direct investment, governments have sought to design policies vis-à-vis foreign …rms entering their market. In formulating their approach to the treatment of foreign …rms producing in their market, many governments perceive the costs and bene…ts of the two modes of FDI as very di¤erent.
In a number of host countries, concern is expressed in political discussions and the media that FDI entry through the takeover of domestic …rms is less bene…cial, if not positively harmful, for economic development than entry by setting up new facilities. At the heart of these concerns is that foreign acquisitions do not add to productive capacity but simply transfer ownership and control from domestic to foreign hands. (United Nations Center for Transnational Corporations, 2000, p. xxiii) Interestingly, while the CEOs of multinational …rms and government policymakers believe that green…eld investment and cross-border M&A are distinct modes of FDI, the academic literature in International Trade has not distinguished between the two modes. In fact, almost all of the literature has implicitly assumed that FDI takes the form of green…eld. Yet, empirical evidence shows that …rms engaging in FDI have entered foreign markets mainly by purchasing existing foreign …rms rather than by building new plants. As …gure 1 illustrates, in every year from 1981 to 2001, between 75% and 90% of all new foreign a¢ liates in U.S. manufacturing have been acquired by foreign …rms (cross-border M&A), while only 10% -25% have been newly established (green…eld investment).
Given the empirical importance of cross-border M&A, it is worth asking …rst why mergers occur more generally. According to the business literature, …rms di¤er in their underlying capabilities, and many mergers occur to allow …rms to exploit complementarities in these capabilities. In the international context, cross-border mergers often occur because local …rms have some capabilities, such as the knowledge of local market conditions that foreign …rms lack, while foreign …rms bring some other capabilities, such as organizational capital or technology to the party. That is, cross-border mergers are frequently motivated by the complementarities between internationally mobile and non-mobile capabilities. Caves (1996, p. 70 ) summarizes this motive as follows:
The going concern is a working coalition. From the viewpoint of the foreign MNE, it possesses an operating local management familiar with the national market environment. The MNE that buys the local …rm also buys access to a stock of valuable information.
A cross-border acquisition thus allows a …rm to get costly access to the country-speci…c capabilities of the acquired …rm, and the price of such an acquisition is governed by demand and supply. In contrast, by engaging in green…eld FDI, a …rm brings only its own capabilities to work abroad. Di¤erent …rms will solve this trade-o¤ di¤erently.
One contribution of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework of international commerce in which …rms can choose between di¤erent modes of foreign market access (exporting vs. green…eld FDI vs. cross-border M&A). Our framework formalizes the three key ideas developed above. First, there is heterogeneity in …rms'capabilities. Second, these capabilities di¤er in their degree of international mobility. Third, capabilities are traded in a merger market, and so the price of capabilities is determined by (endogenous) supply and demand. We then use this framework to address two questions: (1) what are the characteristics of …rms that choose these various modes of foreign market access, and (2) how does the composition of international commerce vary across industries and countries? The three key ideas on which our framework builds have important consequences for our understanding of international commerce.
First, because we distinguish between mobile and non-mobile capabilities we are able to identify a unique motive for …rms to engage in FDI: to obtain non-mobile capabilities in other countries. We …nd that as capabilities become relatively less mobile internationally that crossborder M&A becomes the favored mode of entry into foreign markets. Given the relative importance of cross-border M&A in total FDI, our framework suggests that a key motive for FDI is to obtain non-mobile capabilities. To our knowledge, the empirical Trade literature ignores the role of non-mobile capabilities in the trade-o¤ between exports and FDI.
Second, we show that the source of …rm heterogeneity is a critical determinant of the composition of international commerce. While …rms have long been known to di¤er within industries in terms of their observed e¢ ciency, the underlying source of this heterogeneity is likely to di¤er across industries. In industries where …rms di¤er mainly in their mobile capabilities, the most e¢ cient …rms will engage in cross-border M&A, while in industries where …rms di¤er mainly in their country-speci…c non-mobile capabilities, cross-border M&A will involve the least e¢ cient active …rms. The composition of international commerce for the two types of industries is illustrated in …gure 2.
This dichotomy has wide-ranging implications for empirical work. A small but fast growing empirical literature seeks to understand the relationship between a …rm's characteristics and its choice of mode of serving foreign markets. By and large, researchers impose a single mapping from …rm characteristics to mode choice across industries and obtain mixed results. Our theory suggests the common procedure of pooling industries in regression analyses is inappropriate as the mapping from …rm characteristics to mode choices di¤ers qualitatively across industries in a systematic fashion.
Third, we show that the presence of a merger market clearing condition for country-speci…c capabilities has wide ranging implication for the e¤ect of other country and industry characteristics on the distribution of e¢ ciencies within an industry. In our model, foreign …rms demand local non-mobile capabilities which are in turn supplied by local …rms. Mergers thus have a direct e¤ect on the nature of …rms producing in a country and so in ‡uence aggregate industry e¢ ciency. To the extent that changes in country and industry characteristics alter the supply and demand for local non-mobile capabilities, the e¤ect of changes in these characteristics is mediated by the merger market. In models without cross-border M&A, the e¤ect of country and industry variables on aggregate industry e¢ ciency can be dramatically di¤erent. Our results are thus of interest to a growing empirical research into the e¤ect of international commerce on aggregate industry e¢ ciency.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to a growing literature that analyzes the endogenous selection of heterogeneous …rms into modes of foreign market entry. 1 Within this literature, the paper that is closest in spirit to ours is Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) who consider only two modes of foreign market entry: exports and green…eld FDI. The key di¤erences between our paper and that of Helpman et al. (HMY) is that (i) we introduce the idea that not all types of capabilities are perfectly mobile internationally, and (ii) in our model, …rms can trade capabilities in a merger market. By considering both mobile and non-mobile capabilities, our framework (1) gives rise to cross-border M&A, and (2) yields di¤erent predictions on the composition of international commerce. In HMY, …rms that engage in FDI are the most e¢ cient …rms within an industry. In contrast, we …nd that …rms conducting FDI via cross-border M&A are the least e¢ cient active …rms when the source of …rm heterogeneity is due to non-mobile capabilities. We also …nd that the merger market clearing condition, not present in HMY, has important implications for the e¤ect of country and industry characteristics on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies. For example, in HMY, the mapping from a …rm's e¢ ciency to its mode of foreign market access is independent of the size of a country, while in our setting, size must matter for the merger market to clear.
Our paper also contributes to the industrial organization literature on endogenous horizontal mergers. In contrast to our paper, this literature has mainly been concerned with market power as the driving force of mergers, and with the limits of monopolization through acquisition (e.g., Kamien and Zang (1990) , Nocke (2000) ). One notable exception is the paper by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) , where acquisitions are modeled as the outcome of a stochastic productivity process in which …rms receiving bad technology shocks sell their capacity to more e¢ cient …rms. The literature on cross-border M&A is still in its infancy, and authors in this literature have also focused on market power as the motivation for mergers (e.g., Head and Ries (1997) , Horn and Persson (2001) , Neary (2003) ). 2 Outline. The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe in detail our theoretical framework. Then, in section 3, we turn to the equilibrium analysis. We derive the composition of international commerce and show how it depends on the source of …rm heterogeneity. In section 4, we investigate the e¤ects of country and industry characteristics on the composition of international commerce and the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies. We conclude in section 5.
The Model
We consider a model of international trade with two countries, 1 and 2, indexed by k (and sometimes l). The aggregate income level in country k is denoted by Y k . We assume that the two countries are of similar size so that jY 1 Y 2 j is small. The countries are identical in all other respects. In particular, the price of labor is the same in both countries, and normalized to 1. The assumption of equal wages follows from the existence of an outside good that is produced by both countries and requires only labor.
Preferences. The representative consumer has two-tier preferences: Cobb-Douglas preferences over the homogeneous outside good and two types of di¤erentiated goods, M and N , and CES preferences over varieties of each di¤erentiated good. She spends a fraction i of her income on the di¤erentiated goods industry i 2 fM; N g. Her sub-utility over the varieties of the di¤erentiated good i 2 fM; N g can be written as
where x k (!) and q k (!) are the level of consumption and the perceived quality of variety !, respectively, and i the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Firms. Each …rm produces one unique variety at constant marginal costs of production. Firms di¤er in their capabilities. There are two types of capabilities: mobile and non-mobile. The e¢ ciency of a …rm's production technology is assumed to be mobile internationally. There is an inverse relationship between a …rm's mobile capability e m i and a …rm's marginal cost c( e m i ):
In contrast to technology, marketing expertise is assumed not to travel well. Firm's di¤er in the quality of their marketing expertise, and the better the marketing expertise, the higher is the perceived quality of the good. To emphasize the observation that marketing expertise is not perfectly mobile internationally, we refer to a …rm's marketing expertise as the …rm's non-mobile capability n k i . The …rm's perceived quality in country k is given by
where i 2 (0; 1). The idea here is that n k i is a measure of quality of the …rm's marketing team (or distribution network, sales force etc.) in country k. Ceteris paribus, a marketing team is better in its home country than abroad: this is captured by the degree of mobility i . Indeed, there is recent empirical evidence suggesting that domestic …rms have an advantage over foreign …rms in marketing activities in their own country; see Maurin, Thesmar, and Thoenig (2002) . 3 Both mobile and non-mobile capabilities are industry-speci…c and can only be used by one …rm at any time. Production and marketing have to be undertaken within the …rm. A …rm owning a collection of capabilities, can use no more than one capability of each type (non-mobile capability for each country, and mobile capability). Therefore, a …rm can be de…ned by its ownership of its best mobile and non-mobile capabilities, fn 1 i ; n 2 i ; e m i g, and by its home country. For convenience, we call a …rm's home country the country in which the …rm's capability e m i was originally (i.e., upon entry) created. If …rms ship the …nal output from one country to another, iceberg-type transportation costs have to be incurred: for one unit to arrive in the foreign country, i > 1 units need to be shipped. The existence of these transportation costs (or tari¤s) makes the cost of serving a market sensitive to the location of production. If the good is produced in country k and then shipped to country l 6 = k, the marginal cost of serving country l is i c( e m i ). In addition to the variable costs, …xed (corporate management) costs have be incurred by multinational …rms. First, there is a …xed coordination cost F c;i that has to be incurred whenever the marketing team and the production of the good are in di¤erent locations. This coordination cost need not be incurred if (i) production takes place only in country k and the …rm uses a country-k marketing team, and (ii) production takes place in both countries and the …rm uses a marketing team in each country. Second, there is a …xed cost F f;i of managing a foreign marketing team.
For notational convenience, we will henceforth work with the following transforms of e m i and i :
The bene…t of these transformations is that a …rm's pro…t is linear in the rede…ned variables. Note that T i < 1 is inversely related to i , while m i is positively related to e m i . Entry. There is a continuum of (atomless) potential entrants, each of which is endowed with the know how to produce a unique variety. Entrants can only enter the market in their own country. If they decide to do so, they have to pay an (irrecoverable) entry fee F e;i . After a …rm has paid the entry cost, it gets a random draw of its (local) non-mobile (marketing) capability (n k i 0 for an entrant in country k), and of its mobile capability (m i 0). A new entrant in country k is assumed to have no marketing expertise speci…c to the other country, i.e., n l i = 0 for l 6 = k. This captures in a tractable manner the idea that …rms have an advantage in acquiring capabilities speci…c to their own home country.
We assume that capabilities of an entrant in country k, n k i and m i , are independently distributed. Industries are likely to di¤er in the underlying source of heterogeneity between …rms. To isolate the implications of heterogeneity in the di¤erent types of capabilities, we assume that in industry M the underlying source of heterogeneity is in …rms'mobile capabilities, while in industry N it is in …rms'non-mobile capabilities. In both industries, the "good"mobile and non-mobile capabilities are scarce.
Industry M There is heterogeneity in …rms'mobile capabilities (m M ), while the distribution of …rms' non-mobile capabilities (n k M ) is degenerate. More precisely, for an entrant in country k,
with probability ; 0 with probability 1 ; m M H( ) continuous with support [0; 1):
Industry N There is heterogeneity in …rms'non-mobile capabilities (n k N ), while the distribution of …rms'mobile capabilities (m N ) is degenerate. More precisely, for an entrant in country k; m N = 1 with probability ; 0 with probability 1 ;
Each …rm can produce only one variety due, for instance, to entrepreneurs' limited span of control (Lucas (1978) ). Moreover, any capability can productively be used only by a single …rm.
Merger Market. After …rms have entered the market, their endowment of capabilities can be traded in a perfectly competitive merger market. The equilibrium value (or pro…t) of a …rm in home market k with capabilities fn 1 i ; n 2 i ; m i g can be decomposed as
where V k i (n) is the market price for capability n i in country k and industry i, and W k i (m i ) the market price of capability m i in country k and industry i. While a …rm is identi…ed by the ownership of its capabilities (and its home country), we do not need to identify the "owner" of the …rm who is buying or selling capabilities on the merger market. However, it may be convenient for the reader to identify a …rm's ownership with its mobile capability m i (and so only the non-mobile capabilities are traded on the merger market, while W k i (m i ) is the shadow value of m i ).
Firms and the Post-Merger Location of Production. As we will show in the next section, all …rms will locate the production in their home country. Firms will therefore serve their home market entirely from local production. If …rms only locate production in their home country, they export their good to the foreign market, incurring iceberg-type transport costs. If …rms choose to serve the foreign market by locating production abroad (FDI), they may choose between green…eld FDI and cross-border M&A. The distinction between these two modes of FDI is that a …rm engaging in the former does not acquire a non-mobile capability speci…c to the foreign country.
Product Market Competition.
Since there is a continuum of atomless …rms (each facing a downward-sloping demand curve), we may think of …rms as either setting prices or quantities. We allow …rms to discriminate between markets, so that they can set di¤erent prices (or quantities) for the two countries.
Timing. The timing of the model may be summarized as follows.
Entry Stage In each country, potential entrants decide whether or not to enter the market.
Merger Stage Firms participate in the merger market (as buyers or sellers), and decide where to locate production (incurring the associated …xed costs).
Output stage Firms compete in prices (or quantities) and receive pro…ts.
Equilibrium. Formally, the model may be cast as an anonymous game. We seek the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
Equilibrium Analysis: The Composition of International Commerce
In this section, we turn to the equilibrium analysis of our model and determine the equilibrium pattern of export, green…eld FDI, and international mergers. We derive …rms' payo¤s as a function of their capabilities and their mode of foreign market access. We then turn to the equilibrium analysis in each of the two industries. First, we will consider industry M , where …rms di¤er in their mobile capabilities. Then, we will analyze industry N , where …rms di¤er in their non-mobile capabilities. Solving the representative consumer's utility maximization problem, we obtain the following demand for any variety of good i in country k:
where p k (!) is the price of variety ! in country k, and
the aggregate price index for good i in country k. Let b c k i (!) denote the marginal cost of selling variety ! in country k, inclusive of the (icebergtype) transportation cost (if any). Recall that …rms can price-discriminate between countries. Pro…t maximization then implies that each …rm charges a …xed markup, and so p k (!) = b c k i (!)= i . Hence, the gross pro…t of a …rm selling variety ! in country k is given by
where the markup-adjusted residual demand level S k i is given by
It is straightforward to show that the cross-country di¤erences in the market prices of capabilities are arbitrarily small, given that the two countries are of su¢ ciently similar size. It then follows that a …rm will never produce abroad without also producing at home. To see this, note that the …rm could just switch production (including the ownership of the non-mobile capabilities) from one country to the other, and increase its pro…t by saving on the …xed costs (F c;i or F f;i ), whereas all other components of pro…ts will only change by an arbitrarily small amount. A …rm will always serve its home market by locating production at home, and so …rms will only di¤er in their way of serving the foreign market. Further, a …rm will never have a marketing team abroad without also having one at home: otherwise, it could sell the foreign marketing team, buy a domestic marketing team, and save the coordination cost F c;i . Hence, we are left with three modes of foreign market access: (i) production at home, using a home marketing marketing team (export); (ii) production at home and abroad, using a home marketing team (green…eld FDI), and (iii) production at home and abroad, using a marketing team in each country (cross-border merger).
For each of the three modes of foreign market access, the gross pro…t of a …rm with capabilities fn 1 i ; n 2 i ; m i g that is generated in country k is given by 
Industry M : Heterogeneity in Mobile Capabilities
We …rst consider industry M , where mobile capability m is heterogeneous across …rms and the distribution of …rms' non-mobile capabilities n k is degenerate. Speci…cally, for an entrant in country k, m is drawn from the continuous and strictly increasing distribution function H( ) with density h( ) and support [0; 1), while n k = 1 with probability (independently of the realization of m), and n k = 0 otherwise.
Since the non-mobile capability n k = 0 cannot be used for generating pro…ts, its market value must be zero, i.e., V k (0) = 0. In equilibrium, …rms with di¤erent mobile capabilities m will take di¤erent actions in the merger market. Since each active …rm needs exactly one mobile capability m, it is convenient to consider the optimal decisions of a …rm at the merger stage, conditional on owning a particular m in country k. Her payo¤ from exporting is
where V k (1) is the opportunity cost of using (or the actual cost of purchasing) the domestic non-mobile capability n k = 1. If, instead, she decides to purchase both a domestic n k = 1 and a foreign n l = 1 (cross-border M&A), she obtains a payo¤ of
where F f is the …xed cost of managing the foreign marketing team in country l. Finally, if she decides to engage in green…eld investment abroad, her expected payo¤ is
where F c is the coordination cost associated with production in country l, using a marketing team in country k. At the beginning of the merger stage, the value of a …rm with mobile capability m in country k is thus
o : 
We can summarize the equilibrium sorting of …rms as follows. It is straightforward to see that some …rms (namely those with high m) will always engage in cross-border mergers. While parameters may be such that no …rm engages in green…eld investment or exporting, it is straightforward to …nd conditions such that, in equilibrium, there is a positive mass of …rms engaging in each of the three modes of foreign market access.
For instance, if the …xed cost of entry, F e , is su¢ ciently small (or T su¢ ciently large) and the …xed cost of managing a foreign marketing team, F f , su¢ ciently large, then each mode of foreign market access will be used by some …rms.
Henceforth, we restrict attention to the nonempty parameter space where 0 < m k 0 < m k 1 < m k 2 . In this case, the thresholds are given by
Firms that decide to export are thus less e¢ cient than …rms that engage in FDI (through either green…eld investment or cross-border mergers). On the one hand, exports require lower …xed costs. On the other, transport costs have to be incurred for each unit shipped abroad, and so the marginal increase in payo¤ from raising mobile capability m is lower than with FDI. Similarly, …rms that engage in green…eld investment su¤er from the lower perceived quality relative to …rms that purchased a local non-mobile capability, but save the market price of such a capability. Merger Market Equilibrium. We now consider equilibrium in the merger market. Since each entrant is "born" with one mobile capability m, and each active …rm needs only one m, we may restrict attention to the merger market for non-mobile capabilities.
Let E k denote the mass of entrants in country k. Since the probability of n k = 1 for a new entrant is equal to , the supply (through entry) of non-mobile capabilities of type n k = 1 in country k is E k . Each active domestic …rm needs a non-mobile capability of type n k = 1, and so the domestic demand is E k 1 H(m k 0 ) . Moreover, all foreign entrepreneurs who decide to engage in cross-border M&A also require a domestic non-mobile capability of type n k = 1, and so the foreign demand is E l 1 H(m l 2 ) . The clearing condition for the merger market in country k is thus given by
Note that foreign buyers of domestic non-mobile capabilities in the merger market tend to be more e¢ cient (in that they have higher m's) than domestic buyers: foreign buyers are all …rms with m m l 2 , while domestic buyers are those domestic …rms with m m k 0 who received a n k = 0 upon entry. We now claim that for the merger market to clear the market price of a viable non-mobile capability must be positive: V k (1) > 0. To see this, note that the right-hand side of the merger market clearing condition, (7), is positive. Since < 1, for the left-hand side to be positive as well, we must have m k 0 > 0, and so, from (4), V k (1) > 0. Free Entry. We now turn to …rm behavior at the entry stage. Since each potential entrant in country k has the option of not entering and earning zero pro…ts, in equilibrium, potential entrants must be indi¤erent between entering and not entering. We thus have
Using (3), the expected value of the mobile capability m is given by
where
It will prove useful to rewrite the demand level S k , de…ned by (2), as
Equilibrium. Equilibrium in industry M with 0 < m k 0 < m k 1 < m k 2 can formally be de…ned as the collection of endogenous variables for each country k,
, satisfying equations (4) to (10).
Industry N : Heterogeneity in Immobile Capabilities
We now turn to industry N , where non-mobile capabilities (n k ) are heterogeneous across …rms and the distribution of …rms'mobile capabilities (m) is degenerate. Speci…cally, for an entrant in country k, n k is drawn from the continuous distribution function G( ) with density g( ) and support [0; 1), while m = 1 with probability (independently of the realization of n k ), and m = 0 otherwise.
Since a mobile capability with m = 0 cannot be used for production, its market value must be zero, i.e., W k (0) = 0. Consider now a …rm which already owns a mobile capability of type m = 1 in country k. The …rm may decide to export, the maximum payo¤ of which is
Let k x denote the set of non-mobile capabilities that will be used, in equilibrium, for exports. The …rm must be indi¤erent between each of these non-mobile capabilities, and so
Alternatively, the …rm may decide to engage in green…eld investment abroad. The maximum payo¤ of this mode of foreign market access is
Denoting by k g the set of non-mobile capabilities that will be used for green…eld investment, we must have
to ensure that the …rm is indi¤erent between all the non-mobile capabilities in k g . Finally, the …rm may decide to engage in cross-border M&A, the maximum payo¤ of which is given by
Note that this payo¤ is independent of the …rm's home country, i.e., w k m = w l m . Denoting by k m the set of non-mobile capabilities that will be used for cross-border mergers, we must have
Next, note that
Assuming W k (1) > 0 (which holds in equilibrium), we must have V k (n) = 0 for n su¢ ciently small. That is, the least e¢ cient non-mobile capabilities will not be used in equilibrium. Combining these observations, it follows that there are thresholds n k 0 , n k 1 , and n k 2 , such that all non-mobile capabilities n k 2 0; n k 0 are not used in equilibrium, all n k 2 n k 0 ; n k 1 = k m are used for cross-border mergers, all n k 2 n k 1 ; n k 2 = k x are employed for exports to country l 6 = k, while all n k 2 n k 2 ; 1 = k g are used for green…eld investment. Hence, in contrast to industry M , the …rms engaging in cross-border mergers are the least e¢ cient active …rms. If one capability is of varying quality, then …rms would optimally like to spread the best capabilities over as many units as possible. Cross-border mergers allow mobile capabilities to be used in both countries, whereas country-speci…c non-mobile capabilities will only be employed in one country. Hence, if there is heterogeneity in the non-mobile capabilities (and homogeneity in the mobile capabilities), then cross-border mergers will involve worse capabilities than exports and green…eld investment. In industry M , the reverse is true. What remains true is that …rms engaging in green…eld investment are more e¢ cient than those who decide to export. The equilibrium sorting of …rms can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, there exist unique thresholds 0 < n k 0 n k 1 n k 2 such that in industry N and country k, all non-mobile capabilities n k 2 0; n k 0 exit, all non-mobile capabilities n k 2 n k 0 ; n k 1 are used for cross-border M&A, all non-mobile capabilities n k 2 n k 1 ; n k 2 are used for exports, while all remaining non-mobile capabilities n k > n k 2 are used for green…eld FDI.
It is straightforward to …nd conditions such that, in equilibrium, each mode of foreign market access is used by some …rms. This holds, for instance, if the coordination cost F c is su¢ ciently large (or transport costs are su¢ ciently small so that T is su¢ ciently close to 1) and the …xed cost of managing a foreign marketing team, F f , su¢ ciently small.
Henceforth, we restrict attention to the nonempty subset of the parameter space where k m , k x , and k g are non-empty, and so
Since non-mobile capabilities can be traded, conditional on owning a mobile capability of type m = 1, each …rm is indi¤erent between exporting, green…eld investment, and cross-border M&A. This implies
Moreover, since the payo¤ from cross-border mergers is independent of the …rm's home country, w k m = w l m , the value of the mobile capability must be the same in both countries:
Note that viable mobile capabilities (m = 1) are scarce since with positive probability a new entrant obtains a non-viable mobile capability (m = 0), whereas all non-mobile capabilities are viable (n k > 0). Hence, W (1) > 0.
The market price for non-mobile capabilities, V k (n), can then be written as follows:
The thresholds n k i are thus given by
Merger Market Equilibrium. We are now in the position to consider equilibrium in the merger market. Any cross-border merger involves exactly one non-mobile capability from each country. In country k, the mass of non-mobile assets used for cross-border mergers is E k G(n k 1 ) G(n k 0 ) . Hence, for market clearing, we must have
Moreover, the market for mobile capabilities must clear as well. The world supply of mobile capabilities of type m = 1 is E k + E l . On the demand side, the number of …rms in country k engaging in exporting or green…eld investment is E k 1 G(n k 1 ) . In addition, in the two countries together, there is a mass
When the two countries are identical, foreign buyers purchase less e¢ cient domestic non-mobile capabilities in the merger market than domestic buyers: foreign buyers purchase n k 2 [n k 0 ; n k 1 ), while domestic buyers (who are those …rms who received a n k < n k 0 upon entry) purchase n k 2 [n k 0 ; 1). Free Entry. In equilibrium, the value of a new entrant must be equal to zero. This free entry condition can be written as
and
It will prove useful to rewrite the markup-adjusted (residual) demand level S k , de…ned by (2), as
Equilibrium. Equilibrium in industry N with 0 < n k 0 < n k 1 < n k 2 can formally be de…ned as the collection of endogenous variables for each country k, V k ( ); W ( ); E k ; S k ; n k 0 ; n k 1 ; n k 2 k2f1;2g , satisfying equations (11) to (20).
Discussion
In both industries M and N , di¤erent …rms will choose a di¤erent mode of foreign market access. However, the theory's predictions on the relationship between a …rm's e¢ ciency (as measured by the ratio between perceived quality and marginal cost) and its equilibrium mode of foreign market access are very di¤erent for the two industries. In industry M , the most 4 For each country, there is the additional restriction that
. However, since the two countries are assumed to be of su¢ ciently similar size, this condition is satis…ed if (16) holds. e¢ cient …rms engage in cross-border M&A, less e¢ cient …rms engage in green…eld FDI, while the least e¢ cient active …rms export to the foreign country. In contrast, in industry N , it is the least e¢ cient active …rms that engage in cross-border M&A, more e¢ cient …rms engage in exporting, and the most e¢ cient …rms in green…eld FDI. Below, we discuss the economics of the assignment of capabilities, and provide an intuition for the di¤erences in the predictions for the two industries.
To understand the role of mergers in our model, consider a social planner whose objective it is to assemble …rms from the existing (post-entry) supplies of mobile and non-mobile capabilities in each country so as to maximize aggregate industry pro…ts, taking as given the markupadjusted residual demand level S. Indeed, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive merger market, the equilibrium assignment of capabilities maximizes industry pro…ts for any …xed S.
In assigning non-mobile to mobile capabilities, the resource constraint facing the social planner in the two industries is similar in two important respects. First, the social planner can assemble two kinds of …rms: (i) …rms that use one viable mobile and non-mobile capability (exporters or green…eld FDI), and (ii) …rms that use one viable mobile capability in conjunction with one viable non-mobile capability from each country (cross-border M&A). By doing the latter, the planner allows the …rm to avoid transport costs and to use non-mobile capabilities that are specialized for each country. Second, in both industries, there is homogeneity in one type of capability and heterogeneity in the other.
Given the nature of random draws of capabilities at the entry stage, the homogeneous capability is scarce in the sense that the mass of viable homogeneous capabilities is less than the mass of viable heterogeneous capabilities. Hence, the optimal assignment of capabilities in each industry is such that all heterogeneous capabilities below a certain threshold value remain inactive. This threshold capability is directly a¤ected by the mass of capabilities used for crossborder mergers. Cross-border M&A has thus an important impact on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies within an industry, which we explore in more detail in the section on comparative statics.
While the mass of viable heterogeneous capabilities exceeds the mass of viable homogeneous capabilities, "low quality" heterogeneous capabilities are imperfect substitutes for "high quality" heterogeneous capabilities. In that sense, the best heterogeneous capabilities are scarce and should thus be used in the most e¤ective manner. The existence of trade frictions in our model -transport costs and imperfect mobility of marketing -reduces the e¤ective size of markets. This gives rise to a "superstar phenomenon" (Rosen, 1981) : the best heterogeneous capabilities should be assigned to serve the largest markets.
The planner faces a di¤erent problem in the two industries as the source of …rm heterogeneity is very di¤erent. Consider …rst industry M , where the mobile capability m is heterogeneous, and in each country the supply of these capabilities exceeds the supply of the viable homogeneous capability n k = 1. The existence of trade frictions implies that mobile capabilities used for cross-border mergers serve a larger e¤ective market than those used for either exports or green…eld FDI. Since the best mobile capabilities are the "superstars" in this industry, the social planner optimally assigns the best mobile capabilities to cross-border mergers. Arranging cross-border mergers comes at a cost, however: since each mobile capability is assigned to two scarce non-mobile capabilities (one from each country), it is necessary to increase m 0 , the threshold value of m below which all mobile capabilities are inactive. That is, increasing the number of cross-border mergers comes at the expense of the number of varieties o¤ered.
The trade-o¤s facing the social planner are very di¤erent in industry N , where it is the non-mobile capability n k that is heterogeneous, and in each country the supply of all n k > 0 is greater than the supply of the viable mobile capability m = 1. Non-mobile capabilities used for cross-border mergers serve a smaller e¤ective market (one country rather than two) than those used for either exports or green…eld FDI. Since the best non-mobile capabilities are the "superstars" in this industry, the social planner optimally assigns the worst active non-mobile capabilities to cross-border mergers. As before, the bene…t of a cross-border merger is to avoid trade frictions. Since each cross-border involves two non-mobile capabilities (one from each country) sharing a single mobile capability, an increase in the number of cross-border mergers leads to a lower threshold value n k 0 , below which non-mobile capabilities are inactive. A key di¤erence between the two industries is therefore that an increase in the volume of cross-border mergers has the opposite e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of the marginal active …rm: in industry M , it leads to an increase in the quality of the marginal capability used, while in industry N , it leads to a decrease. As we will show later, this will play out in very di¤erent predictions on the e¤ects of country and industry characteristics on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies. The source of …rm heterogeneity matters. 5 If cross-border mergers were not feasible, the source of …rm heterogeneity would not matter: the composition of international commerce would qualitatively be the same in the two industries. Both exporting and green…eld FDI involve mobile and non-mobile capabilities in only one location, but the latter involves no transport costs and hence a larger e¤ective market size. Consequently, in both industries, the more e¢ cient …rms should engage in green…eld FDI rather than in exporting.
Comparative Statics
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of country and industry characteristics on the composition of international commerce, and on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies. We show that the source of …rm heterogeneity has wide-ranging implications for the e¤ects of country and industry characteristics on the e¢ ciency of the marginal …rm.
5 By restricting attention to one-sided heterogeneity in each industry, we are able to identify the source of …rm heterogeneity as an important industry characteristic for both the composition of international commerce as well as the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies. If we were to assume two-sided heterogeneity in both the mobile and non-mobile capabilities, a complex interaction between countervailing e¤ects would arise. From our discussion of the superstar phenomenon, cross-border mergers should involve the best mobile capabilities and the worst non-mobile capabilities. However, complementarities between mobile and non-mobile capabilities (as assumed in our model) should imply positive assortative matching, i.e., the best non-mobile capabilities should be employed with the best mobile capabilities. But if the best mobile and non-mobile capabilities were involved in crossborder M&A, the best non-mobile capabilities would wastefully serve only one market. General analytical results for the case of two-sided heterogeneity are unavailable.
Country Size
What is the e¤ect of country size on the equilibrium pattern of exports, green…eld FDI, and cross-border M&A? We address this question by …rst assuming that countries are initially identical, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2 , and then considering a small change in country sizes that maintains global income so that dY k = dY l > 0. The following lemma simpli…es our discussion. (All proofs are relegated to the appendix.)
Lemma 1 Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2 , and consider a small change in country sizes such that dY k = dY l . Then, the change in any endogenous variable u has the same absolute value in the two countries, but is of opposite sign: du k = du l .
We …rst turn to the e¤ects of changes in country size in industry M .
Proposition 3 Consider industry M . Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2 , and consider a small increase in the size of country k (and a small decrease in the size of country l 6 = k) such that dY k = dY l > 0. Then,
where m k 0 and m k 2 are the (new) thresholds in the larger market. Furthermore,
We now want to discuss the intuition for these results. Appealing to lemma 1, we focus on the larger country k. The direct e¤ect of a redistribution of global income is to raise the markup-adjusted residual demand curve in country k. This raises the number of entrants, E k . Consider now the merger market clearing condition for country k, as given by equation (7),
On the l.h.s. is the "net supply" (after domestic mergers) of the viable non-mobile capability n k = 1, while on the r.h.s. is the foreign demand for this capability. At the initial thresholds, there is now an excess supply of n k = 1. This causes the market value of this capability to drop, dV k (1) < 0. Thus it is now more attractive for mobile capabilities to be used in the larger market: demand is higher, dS k > 0, and non-mobile capabilities are cheaper, dV k (1) < 0. Firms in the smaller country l will therefore integrate to a larger extent into country k, and so dm l 1 < 0 and dm l 2 < 0. For the same reason, the value of those mobile capabilities in country k that are used for exporting or green…eld FDI is now larger, dW k (m) > 0 for m 2 (m k 0 ; m k 2 ). Consequently, less e¢ cient mobile capabilities will still be used in equilibrium, dm k 0 < 0. Since global market size remains unchanged, the value of those mobile capabilities that continue to be used for cross-border M&A does not change.
We now turn to the e¤ects of changes in country size in industry N .
Proposition 4 Consider industry N . Suppose the two countries are initially of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2 , and consider a small increase in the size of country k (and a small decrease in the size of country l 6 = k) such that dY k = dY l > 0. Then,
and there exists a unique cuto¤ b n 2 (n k 0 ; n k 1 ] such that
where n k i (n l i ) refers to a new threshold in market k (l). Furthermore,
The direct e¤ect of the redistribution of global income from country l to country k is to raise the markup-adjusted residual demand level S k in country k; and to reduce it in country l. This direct e¤ect has several immediate implications. First, it follows from equation (14) that dn k 2 > 0: in country k, …rms switch from green…eld FDI to exporting since the incentive to avoid transport cost is weaker in a smaller market. Second, the value of non-mobile capabilities in each country is altered: as can be seen from equation (11), the increase in S k directly raises the value of all non-mobile capabilities V k (n) in country k. In contrast, the shadow value of viable mobile capabilities is una¤ected by the redistribution of global income since the value of these capabilities must be the same in both countries. The increase in the value of nonmobile capabilities in country k induces a larger number of entrants, E k . The greater supply of non-mobile capabilities depresses their value, and reduces each …rm's residual demand. Does the increased number of entrants reduce the markup-adjusted demand level S k and the price schedule V k (n) to its initial values? The answer is no. If they were to return to their initial levels, the thresholds n k i would be the same as before, but the number of …rms in each country would be di¤erent. However, in this case, the merger market would not clear:
Intuitively, there is an excess supply of small n k 's, and so their market price must fall. Hence, dn k 0 > 0. However, in expectation, the value of an entrant's draw of n k must remain unchanged, as can be seen from the free entry condition. It follows that the market value of large n k 's must rise. Despite the larger number of entrants, the residual demand level S k must be larger, and so the incremental value of a slightly better n k increases: the price schedule V k (n) becomes steeper.
General Discussion of Country E¤ ects. There are two important lessons that come out of the above analysis. First, in both industries M and N , market size "matters": changes in country size a¤ect the composition of international commerce and the e¢ ciency of the marginal active …rm. This is due to the existence of the merger market. In the absence of the merger market, free entry would imply -as in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) -that the markupadjusted residual demand level were the same in both countries, S k = S l . Independently of any size di¤erence, the thresholds would be the same as well. As explained above, in our model, the markup-adjusted demand levels cannot be the same in countries of di¤erent size since otherwise the cross-border merger market would not clear: there would be an excess supply (demand) of (for) non-mobile capabilities in the larger (smaller) country. 6 Second, the e¤ect of market size on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies is very di¤erent for di¤erent industries as it depends critically on the source of …rm heterogeneity. In industry M , weaker …rms are able to survive in the larger market, while the opposite is true for industry N . 7 While there is dichotomy between industries M and N regarding the e¤ect of market size on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies, a common prediction for both industries is that the fraction of entrants who engage in FDI (through either green…eld or cross-border mergers) is smaller in the larger country. This is consistent with the empirical evidence. 8
Industry Characteristics
Our analysis so far has highlighted the importance of a particular industry characteristic, the source of …rm heterogeneity, for the composition of international commerce. We now investigate how the sorting of …rms into di¤erent modes of foreign market access changes with other industry characteristics, namely transport costs and the …xed cost of cross-border M&A. As our analysis will show, the e¤ects of these industry characteristics will be very di¤erent in industries M and N . For simplicity, we assume that the two countries are identical, Y 1 = Y 2 . For notational convenience, we henceforth drop country indices.
Mobility of Capabilities. We seek to analyze the e¤ects of a change in , the degree of mobility of capability n.
Proposition 5 Consider an increase in , the degree of mobility of capability n. (a) Then, in industry M ,
For …rms engaging in exporting the level of (foreign) market size is proportional to S T , for …rms engaging in green…eld FDI it is proportional to S , while for …rms engaging in crossborder M&A it is proportional to S. In both industries, holding …xed the number of entrants and the thresholds, the direct e¤ect of an increase in is to reduce the markup-adjusted residual 6 While the merger market is necessary for market size to matter, there is a subtle di¤erence between industries M and N . For market size to matter in industry M requires an additional ingredient: the …xed cost F f of managing a foreign marketing team (or some other small friction for cross-border mergers). In contrast, market size would matter for industry N even in the absence of such a …xed cost.
7 The closed-economy models of Asplund and Nocke (2003) and Nocke (2003) predict that …rms have to be more e¢ cient to survive in larger markets, which is in line with the predictions for industry N . However, their result is due to an endogenous increase in the intensity of price competition in larger markets.
8 See, for instance, Yeaple (2003) and Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2002) .
demand level S. However, the induced fractional increase in S is smaller than the (exogenous) fractional increase in , and so S increases. Consequently, the payo¤ from cross-border mergers tends to fall, while the payo¤ from exporting and green…eld FDI tends to rise. However, since …rms engaging in green…eld FDI do not have to incur transport costs, the fractional increase in the payo¤ from green…eld FDI is greater than that from exporting. The e¤ect of the increase in on the thresholds follows immediately from these observations. However, the relative size of the movements in the thresholds is determined by the merger market clearing conditions. In both industries, the primary e¤ect of an increase in the mobility of the less mobile capability n is to change the composition of foreign direct investment. As the mobility of n increases, the ratio between …rms engaging in cross-border M&A and those engaging in green…eld FDI decreases. In the limit as ! 1, cross-border mergers disappear, while in the limit as ! 0, green…eld FDI disappears. Hence, for cross-border M&A to occur, there must be some …rm capabilities that are imperfectly mobile internationally.
Transport Costs. We now turn to the e¤ects of a change in transport costs (or tari¤s) on the composition of international commerce.
Proposition 6 Consider a decrease in transport costs, i.e., an increase in
As pointed out above, for …rms engaging in exporting the level of (foreign) market size is proportional to S T , for …rms engaging in green…eld FDI it is proportional to S , while for …rms engaging in cross-border M&A it is proportional to S. In both industries, holding …xed the number of entrants and the thresholds, the direct e¤ect of an increase in T is to reduce the markup-adjusted residual demand level S. However, the induced fractional increase in S is smaller than the (exogenous) fractional increase in T , and so ST increases. Consequently, the payo¤ from cross-border mergers and green…eld FDI tends to fall, while the payo¤ from exporting tends to rise. However, since …rms engaging in cross-border mergers face a larger foreign demand than …rms engaging in green…eld FDI, the fractional decrease in the payo¤ from cross-border M&A is greater than that from green…eld FDI. The e¤ect of the increase in T on the thresholds follows immediately from these observations. However, the relative size of the movements in the thresholds is determined by the merger market clearing conditions.
In both industries, the primary e¤ect of a decrease in transport costs, i.e., an increase in T , is to change the fraction of …rms engaging in foreign direct investment. As T increases, the fraction of entrants engaging in either cross-border M&A or green…eld FDI decreases. However, as long as is su¢ ciently small, cross-border mergers occur even in the limit as T ! 1, while green…eld FDI disappears in the limit. This may explain why most FDI between the US and Europe, where trade barriers are small, is in the form of cross-border M&A rather than green…eld FDI. In contrast, a much larger fraction of FDI between the North and the South, where trade barriers are large, is in the form of green…eld FDI.
General Discussion of Industry E¤ ects. The e¤ect of changes in and T has very di¤erent implications for the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies in the two industries. In industry M , an increase in either or T reduces the e¢ ciency (m 0 ) of the marginal active …rm, while in industry N , the e¤ect on n 0 is the opposite. The reason for this dichotomy is that the composition of international commerce is very di¤erent in the two industries. In industry M , the marginal active …rm is an exporter, while in industry N , it is a …rm engaging in cross-border M&A. Since an increase in or T makes exporting relatively more attractive and cross-border mergers relative less attractive, m 0 has to fall in industry M , while n 0 rises in industry N . These results have important implications for the growing empirical literature on the e¤ects of trade policies on aggregate productivity. Crucially, our theory shows that the empirical relationship between trade costs and aggregate industry e¢ ciency cannot be predicted without prior knowledge of the source of …rm heterogeneity in that industry.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a theory of international commerce in which …rms can choose between three di¤erent modes of foreign market access: exporting, green…eld FDI, and crossborder mergers and acquisitions. Our framework is based on three key ideas. First, there is heterogeneity in …rms' capabilities. Second, these capabilities di¤er in their degree of international mobility. Third, capabilities are traded in a merger market, and so their price is determined by endogenous supply and demand. We have applied this framework to address two questions: (1) what are the characteristics of …rms that choose the di¤erent modes of foreign market access, and (2) what are the e¤ects of country and industry characteristics on the composition of international commerce and the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies? The answers to these questions are of importance to a growing empirical literature on …rm heterogeneity and the composition of international commerce.
A main result of our analysis is that the source of …rm heterogeneity is a critical industry characteristic for the composition of international commerce. Depending on whether …rms di¤er in their mobile or non-mobile capabilities, cross-border M&A involves either the most or the least e¢ cient active …rms. The source of …rm heterogeneity also plays an important role for the e¤ects of country and industry characteristics on the distribution of …rm e¢ ciencies.
Our analysis has also highlighted the importance of the merger market clearing condition for the predictions of our model. Since the changes in country and industry characteristics directly impact upon the supply and demand of capabilities, the e¤ect of these characteristics on aggregate industry e¢ ciency is mediated by the merger market.
While the three key ideas mentioned above are critical for our results, the particular assignment of di¤erent types of capabilities to di¤erent "activities"is not. In this paper, we have considered two types of activities, production and marketing, each of which requires a di¤erent type of capability. More generally, what matters in our framework is that di¤erent activities require capabilities that vary in their degree of international mobility, and that these activities are complementary in generating pro…ts.
Our theory may also be used as a framework to inform government policies toward international commerce. Because cross-border M&A involves the acquisition of a local …rm by a foreign multinational enterprise, cross-border M&A brings "less" to the host country's economy than green…eld FDI. Moreover, as our analysis has shown, …rms with di¤erent capabilities choose di¤erent modes of foreign market access. Hence, the optimal government policy toward foreign direct investment should be tailored to the particular type of FDI: green…eld vs. cross-border M&A. A rigorous analysis of the policy implications of our theory, however, raises a number of modeling issues (government objectives, set of policy instruments) that we plan to address in a separate paper.
Proof of proposition 3. Since the two countries are (initially) of the same size, the merger market clearing condition (7) implies that
Taking the logarithm of the merger market clearing condition, then forming the total derivative, and applying lemma 1, yields
Taking the total derivative of the free entry condition (8), and inserting (21), we obtain
Observe that changes in the thresholds m k i cancel out (i.e., dm k i = 0). This is due to the envelope theorem and the fact that the thresholds are e¢ cient from the …rms'point of view in that they maximize (expected) pro…ts. Note that
. It follows that V k (1) and dS k move in opposite directions, i.e., dV k (1)dS k < 0 whenever dS k 6 = 0.
Taking the total derivatives of the threshold equations (4) to (6) and using lemma 1, yields
We thus obtain that m k 1 and m k 2 move in the same direction as demand level S k , while m k 0 moves in the opposite direction. That is, dm k 1 dS k > 0, dm k 2 dS k > 0, and dm k 0 dS k < 0, provided dS k 6 = 0. From equation (22), it then follows that the mass of entrants E k and demand level S k move in the same direction, i.e., dE k dS k > 0.
Finally, taking the total derivative of equation (10), we obtain
Since 0 (m i ) < 0, the term in curly brackets has the same sign as dE k and dS k . Hence, we must have dS k > 0 because dY k > 0 by assumption. The assertion on W k (m) follows immediately from equation (3), dS k = dS l > 0, and dV k (1) = dV l (1) < 0. Proof of proposition 4. Taking the total derivative of the equation for n k 0 , (12) or, equivalently, (18), and applying lemma 1, we obtain dW (1) = 0. Next, taking the total derivative of the equation for n k 2 , (14), gives
Hence, the threshold n k 2 moves in the same direction as demand level S k , i.e., dn k 2 dS k > 0, provided dS k 6 = 0. Similarly, from the equation for n k 1 , (13), it follows that
where the term in brackets on the r.h.s. is positive since, with initially identical countries,
Consider now the free entry condition, equation (17) . Taking the total derivative, and using (25) and (26), yields
Note that the term in curly brackets on the left-hand side of (28) is positive. It is then immediate that the threshold n k 0 moves in the same direction as demand level S k , i.e., dn k 0 dS k > 0, assuming dS k 6 = 0. From (26), it follows that n k 1 has to move in the opposite direction, i.e., dn k 1 dS k < 0. Taking the total derivative of the merger market clearing condition (15), we obtain
Since n k 0 moves in the same direction as S k , while n k 1 moves in the opposition direction, it follows that the mass of entrants, E k , moves in the same direction as S k , i.e., dE k dS k > 0.
It remains to show that demand level S k moves in the same direction as income (or country size) Y k . Totally di¤erentiating (20), yields
Substituting (29) into (30), and using (25), (26), and (28), yields
Collecting terms and using (27), this equation can be rewritten as
Since the curly brackets on the r.h.s. are positive, and dn k 0 dS k > 0, it follows that demand level S k and income Y k move in the same direction, i.e., dS k > 0 since dY k > 0 by assumption.
Lemma 2 Suppose the two countries are of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2 . Then, in industry M , any change in exogenous variables (except ) causes the thresholds m k 0 and m k 2 to move in opposite directions. That is, dm k 0 dm k 2 < 0, provided dm k 0 6 = 0 or dm k 2 6 = 0.
Proof. Since the two countries are identical, the merger market clearing condition (7) which establishes the result.
Lemma 3 Suppose the two countries are of the same size, i.e., Y 1 = Y 2 . Then, in industry N , any change in exogenous variables (except ) causes the thresholds n k 0 and n k 1 to move in opposite directions. That is, dn k 0 dn k 1 < 0, provided dn k 0 6 = 0 or dn k 1 6 = 0.
Proof. Since the two countries are identical, the market clearing condition for mobile capabilities, equation (16), implies that
The assertion follows immediately. Proof of proposition 5. (a) We begin by totally di¤erentiating the threshold condition for m 1 , equation (5),
Total di¤erentiation of the free entry condition (8), and using (7), yields dS S = T f (m 0 ) (m 1 )g + f (m 1 ) (m 2 )g (1 + T ) (m 0 ) + (1 T ) (m 1 ) + (1 ) (m 2 ) d :
From the last equation, we obtain that dSd < 0. Since the absolute value of the coe¢ cient in front of d is less than one, it then follows from equation (31) that dm 1 d < 0. Combining the remaining two threshold conditions, (4) and (6), and totally di¤erentiating, yields
Totally di¤erentiating this expression and rearranging yields By substituting expression (32) into the last term in brackets, it can be established that this bracketed term must be positive. Since dSd < 0, it follows that the second term is of the same sign as d . Since m 2 and m 0 must move in opposite directions for the merger market to clear (see equation (7)), it follows that dm 2 d > 0 and dm 0 d < 0.
(b) Imposing symmetry, and totally di¤erentiating the three threshold conditions, (12), (13), and (14), yields dW (1) = 2 [Sdn 0 + n 0 dS] ; (33)
From the merger market clearing condition for mobile capabilities, equation (16), we obtain
Totally di¤erentiating the free entry condition (17), yields
Inserting equations (33) to (36) into this equations and simplifying, we obtain
Hence, dS k d < 0. Since the absolute value of the constant in front of d is less than one, it follows from equation (35) that dn 2 d < 0. Moreover, since n 0 and n 1 have to move in opposite directions for the merger market to clear (lemma 3), and since n 0 > T n 1 (as can be seen from (13) 
As in the proof of proposition 3, changes in the thresholds m i cancel out (due to the envelope theorem). Here, however, changes in the market price of working plants, V (1), cancel out as well (if one takes the merger market clearing condition (7) into account) because the two countries are identical. Since the term in front of dT in equation (37) is negative, S and T move in opposite directions, and hence dS < 0. Taking the total derivative of the equation for m 1 (see (5) Substituting out dV (1), and rearranging, we obtain
(1 )dm 2 = (1 + T )dm 0 (1 )m 2 dS S + m 0 dT + 1 + T dS S :
Since dS < 0, the second term on the r.h.s. of (38) is positive. Further, from (37), it follows that the term in curly brackets is positive as well. Hence, if dm 0 > 0, we would have dm 2 > 0. However, this contradicts lemma 2, which states that m 0 and m 2 move in opposite directions. Consequently, we must have dm 0 < 0 and dm 2 > 0.
(b) Imposing symmetry, and totally di¤erentiating the condition for threshold n 0 , equation (12), we obtain dW (1) = 2 [n 0 dS + Sdn 0 ] :
Similarly, from the equation for n k 1 , (13), we derive dT = n 0 T n 1 n 1 dS S + dn 0 T dn 1 n 1 :
Taking the total derivative of equation (14), the condition for threshold n 2 , yields
Totally di¤erentiating the free entry condition, (17), we get dW (1) + dS f (n 0 ) + T (n 1 ) + (1 T ) (n 2 )g
From the merger market clearing condition (16), we can replace in (42) by = [2 G(n 0 ) G(n 1 )] =2. Moreover, using equations (39) to (41), we can rewrite (42) as dS S f (n 0 ) + T (n 1 ) + (1 T ) (n 2 )g = f (n 1 ) (n 2 )g dT:
Clearly, the terms in curly brackets are positive. Hence, we have dS < 0, because dT > 0 by assumption. From (40) and lemma 3, and noting that n 0 > T n 1 (which follows from (13)), we obtain that dn 0 > 0 and dn 1 < 0. Since dT > 0 and dS < 0, from equation (41) we obtain that dn 2 > 0.
